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Changes
S. Fehr [2] pointed out that denoting the complement ΓA = ∆cA [4] as honest (or
good) players structure appears to be a misleading term. Actually its dual access
structure Γ⊥A should be called the honest (or good) players structure, since for
any set G of good players the complement Gc is the set of corrupted players from
∆A. This reflects in some changes of the notations in Theorem 7 and Theorem
8 from [4].
Abstract. Recently Hirt and Maurer [3] introduced the notion ofQ2(Q3)
adversary structure. In this paper we generalize this notion by defining
new operation on access structures and we describe some applications of
the new definition. There is one-to-one correspondence between access
structures and monotone Boolean functions, defined on bipartite graphs.
1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) protects a secret (key) by distributing related
information among a group of participants. This is done in such a way that only
certain pre-specified groups of these participants (the access structure) may re-
construct the secret.
In the “classic” secret sharing schemes, there is assumed to have no faults in the
system. Loosely speaking, in a verifiable secret sharing scheme (VSS) [1] a dealer
shares a secret among a set of participants in such a way that each participant
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can verify if the shares he gets, are consistent with the secret. In other words
a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt the dealer and some subset of the
participants. All other players are honest and the adversary in VSS is static.
Proactive security for secret sharing was first suggested by Ostrovski and Yung
in [5]. Proactive security refers to security and availability in the presence of a
mobile adversary.
The groups who are allowed to reconstruct the secret are called qualified, and
the groups who should not be able to obtain any information about the secret –
forbidden. The collection of all qualified groups is denoted by Γ , and the collec-
tion of all forbidden groups is denoted by ∆. In fact Γ is monotone increasing,
and ∆ is monotone decreasing. The tuple (Γ,∆) is called an access structure
if Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅. If Γ ∪ ∆ = 2P , where P is the set of participants, then we say
that (Γ,∆) is complete and we denote it by Γ . Otherwise we say that (Γ,∆) is
incomplete. There exists an adversary A who can corrupt a set of servers during
any time period. Corrupting a server means learning the secret information in
the server, modifying its data, sending out a wrong message, and so on. Since
the server can be rebooted, the adversary is a mobile one. The collection of all
possible corrupted servers for a fixed time period we call bad and we denote it
by ∆A. The collection of all possible uncorrupted servers for the same period of
time we call good and we denote it by Γ⊥A . So, we can consider a second complete
access structure Γ⊥A , which is called an adversary access structure [3].
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a new operation
for the access structures which extends the notion of Q2(Q3) adversary structure
introduced by Hirt and Maurer [3]. This operation characterizes which adversary
structure can be tolerated. Second, this operation allows us to study how the
participants and the adversary structures are linked.
2 New operation on access structures
Recently Hirt and Maurer [3] introduced the notion of Q2(Q3) adversary struc-
ture.
Definition 1 [3] For a given set of players P and an adversary structure ∆A,
we say that the adversary structure is Q2(P,∆A) if no two sets in ∆A cover the
full set P of players, and correspondingly we say that the adversary structure is
Q3(P,∆A) if no three sets in ∆A cover the full set P of players.
Using the notion of Q2(Q3) adversary structure Hirt and Maurer characterize
exactly which adversary structures can be tolerated. But Hirt and Maurer do not
consider the interaction between the adversary structure and the usual access
structure. In [4] we generalize the Q2(Q3) notion, by introducing a new operation
on access structure.
Definition 2 [4] For the access structure (Γ,∆) we define the operation ∗ as
follows: n ∗∆ = {A = A1 ∪A2;A1 ∈ (n− 1) ∗∆,A2 ∈ ∆}, for n = 2, 3, . . ..
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Let us consider the tuples (Γ,∆), (Γ, 2∗∆), . . . , (Γ, n∗∆). They are access struc-
tures if and only if Γ ∩ n ∗∆ = ∅, because n ∗∆ is monotone decreasing.
Definition 3 [4] For the complete access structure Γ we define the operation ∗
as follows: First we set ∆ = 2P \ Γ and (as in Definition 2) calculate n ∗ ∆.
Then we define n ∗ Γ = 2P \ n ∗∆, for n = 2, 3, . . .
Now we can consider the sequence Γ, 2 ∗ Γ, . . . , n ∗ Γ of access structures if and
only if n∗Γ 6= ∅, i.e. if n∗Γ is non-trivial, because n∗Γ is monotone increasing.
Lemma 4 Let Γ be a complete access structure, then n ∗ Γ 6= ∅ for every n if
and only if there exists a Pi ∈ P such that {Pi} /∈ ∆ (so {Pi} ∈ Γ ).
Now we are ready to define the adversary power pA as follows.
Definition 5 Let ΓA be a complete access structure. We define the adversary
power pA = max{n : n ∗ ΓA 6= ∅}
Since the logic of Secret Sharing Schemes is the secret to be shared, i.e. no one
can reveal the secret on his own, the case when {Pi} ∈ Γ for some Pi is not
of practical interest. For completeness it is easy to see that for such a SSS the
adversary power pA =∞.
Theorem 6 Let ΓA be a complete adversary access structure so ΓA is Q2(Q3),
if and only if pA ≥ 2 (pA ≥ 3).
Now we present some applications of the definitions given above. One can prove
that for VSS the new definition gives rise to the following theorem.
Theorem 7 [4] There exists an unconditionally secure verifiable secret sharing
scheme if the following condition is satisfied: (2 ∗ ΓA)⊥ ⊆ Γ .
Correspondingly for Proactive SSS in [4] we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8 [4] There exists an unconditionally secure proactive secret sharing
scheme if the following conditions are satisfied:
a) (3 ∗ ΓA)⊥ ⊆ Γ .
b) For each group N ∈ Γ− the number of rows for this group of matrix M is
equal to the number of columns of matrix M .
Consider the following scenario: there are n clients, k servers and an audit agency
A which is interested in counting the client visits to the servers in τ different
time frames. For any i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , k, we denote by Ci the i−th
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client and by Sj the j−th server. Such kinds of schemes are called metering
schemes.
We consider an access structure (Γ,∆) of qualified and forbidden groups for
the set of clients {C1, . . . , Cn}. A second access structure (complete) ΓS can be
considered for the set of servers {S1, . . . , Sk}. We call the servers corrupt if they
are not in ΓS . We denote also the set of possible subsets of corrupt clients by ∆C ,
which is in fact monotone decreasing. It is obvious requirement that Γ ∩∆C = ∅.
To deal with this scenario we enhance Definition 2 in the following way.
Definition 9 For the access structure (Γ,∆) and monotone decreasing set ∆C
we define the operation ∗ as follows: ∆∗∆C = {A = A1∪A2;A1 ∈ ∆,A2 ∈ ∆C}.
In order to build an (n, k, τ) metering scheme realizing the access structures
(Γ,∆), ΓS and tolerate corrupted set of clients ∆C , we consider the tuple (Γ,∆∗
∆C). We can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 10 An (n, k, τ) metering scheme realizing the access structures (Γ,∆),
ΓS and tolerate corrupt set of clients ∆C exists, if and only if (Γ,∆ ∗∆C) is an
access structure (i.e. Γ ∩∆ ∗∆C = ∅).
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